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Tiivistelmä-Referat-Abstract
The Second World War and its outbreak have had and continue to have extraordinary resonance throughout the Western political culture of the
last six decades. In particular the generally perceived circumstances of the outbreak of the war continue to function as a kind of morality tale,
which is commonly used as a judgemental reference and is continuously evoked to legitimise political actions. The purpose of this thesis is to
explore this phonomenon. This is done by focusing on one sequence of events – the well-documented Suez Crisis of 1956 – and examining how
those events were viewed through a template of the late 1930’s, the policy of appeasement the culminated in the Munich Conference, and the
subsequent outbreak of war.
The crisis that ensued from Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal took place within three formidable historical contexts: 1) European
decolonisation; 2) the expansion of the Cold War into the Middle East; and 3) the developing Arab/Israeli conflict. Certainly these overlapped,
but it is worth trying to think of them separately for the following reason. The British media and government could have and should have seen
the unfolding crises in these terms – though with some exceptions – failed to. (Indeed there was even a recent precedent, the nationalisation of
Iran’s foreign-owned oilfields by its Prime Minister Mossadeq.) Rather, the British media and government imagined that a familiar set of
circumstances from the past were reborn, and they sought answers in this fourth context, the events of the late 1930s. Why this default to a past
of dubious relevance? Why was the lure of the past, that particular past, so strong as to deflect attention away from urgent, unfolding political
realities?
Suez is treated here as a case study, but the conclusions go beyond that event and comment on the larger question of the continued relevance of
the outbreak on the Second World War to the contemporary world, and the reductive view of history implied by this.
The sources used include British and American diplomatic documents, a broad selection of print media, cartoon images, plus statements made in
Parliament and the media. Several diaries and memoirs will be closely examined. Finally attention will also be given to dissident opinion from
the 1956 crisis, because – it is argued – it too used the same historical defaults.
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